Foundations of a Theory of Social Forms by Polos, L. (Laszlo) et al.
ERIM REPORT SERIES RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT
ERIM Report Series reference number ERS-2000-29-ORG
Publication status / version draft / version March 2000
Number of pages 27
Email address first author Lpolos@fbk.eur.nl
Address Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)
Rotterdam School of Management / Faculteit Bedrijfskunde
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
PoBox 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Phone: # 31-(0) 10-408 1182
Fax: # 31-(0) 10-408 9020
Email: info@erim.eur.nl
Internet:  www.erim.eur.nl
Bibliographic data and classifications of all the ERIM reports are also available on the ERIM website:
www.erim.eur.nl
Foundations of a Theory of Social Forms
Lászlo Pólos, Michael T. Hannan, Glenn R. Carroll
ERASMUS  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  OF  MANAGEMENT
REPORT SERIES
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA AND CLASSIFICATIONS
Abstract Sociologists frequently invoke the concept of form when analyzing organizations, collective
action, art, music, culture and other phenomena. Nonetheless, the form concept has not
received careful theoretical analysis, either generally or in specific context. Using the tools of
formal logic, set theory, and algebra, we propose a language for defining social forms that is
suÆciently general to incorporate feature-based, position-based, and boundary-based
approaches to defining forms. We focus on organizational forms although we intend for our
conceptualization to be general. We define forms as a type of socially coded identity. We de_ne
identity in terms of social codes that specify the properties that an entity can legitimately
possess. These codes can be enforced by insiders or outsiders. We claim that one knows that a
social code exists when one observes that departures from the codes after periods of
conformity cause a devaluation of the entity by relevant insiders and/or outsiders. This
construction allows us to de_ne a population as the set of entities with a common minimal
external identity in a bounded system in period. The minimal property ensures that we localize
to the most speci_c socially enforced identities. The reliance on identities instead of forms
allows us to de_ne populations that never achieve form status and to extend population
de_nitions back to the period of early legitimation. Research design implications follow.
5001-6182 Business
5546-5548.6
5548.7-5548.85
Office Organization and Management
Industrial Psychology
Library of Congress
Classification
(LCC)
6951 Industrial sociology
M Business Administration and Business Economics
M 10
L 2
Business Administration: general
Firm Objectives, Organization and Behavior
Journal of Economic
Literature
(JEL)
L 29 Firm Objectives, Organization and Behavior : Others
85 A Business General
100B
240 B
Organization Theory (general)
Information Systems Management
European Business Schools
Library Group
(EBSLG)
80 J Industrial sociology
Gemeenschappelijke Onderwerpsontsluiting (GOO)
85.00 Bedrijfskunde, Organisatiekunde: algemeen
85.05
85.08
Management organisatie: algemeen
Organisatiesociologie, organisatiepsychologie
Classification GOO
85.08 Organisatiesociologie, organisatiepsychologie
Bedrijfskunde / Bedrijfseconomie
Organisatieleer, informatietechnologie, prestatiebeoordeling
Keywords GOO
Organisatiesociologie, Concepten
Free keywords Foundation of organization theory, Forms, Populations, Identity
Other information
Foundations of a Theory
of Social Forms
1
Laszlo Polos
Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest and Erasmus University, Rotterdam
Michael T. Hannan
Stanford University
Glenn R. Carroll
University of California, Berkeley
March 30, 2000
1
This research was supported by ERIM of Erasmus University, the Center for For-
mal Studies in the Social Sciences at Eotvos Lorand University, the Stanford Grad-
uate School of Business Faculty Trust, and the Institute of Industrial Relations at
U.C. Berkeley. We benetted greatly from the advice of Jim Baron, Jaap Kamps,
Bart Nooteboom, Gabor Peli, and Ezra Zuckerman.
Abstract
Sociologists frequently invoke the concept of formwhen analyzing organizations,
collective action, art, music, culture and other phenomena. Nonetheless, the
form concept has not received careful theoretical analysis, either generally or
in specic context. Using the tools of formal logic, set theory, and algebra,
we propose a language for dening social forms that is suÆciently general to
incorporate feature-based, position-based, and boundary-based approaches to
dening forms. We focus on organizational forms although we intend for our
conceptualization to be general. We dene forms as a type of socially coded
identity. We dene identity in terms of social codes that specify the properties
that an entity can legitimately possess. These codes can be enforced by insiders
or outsiders. We claim that one knows that a social code exists when one
observes that departures from the codes after periods of conformity cause a
devaluation of the entity by relevant insiders and/or outsiders. This construction
allows us to dene a population as the set of entities with a common minimal
external identity in a bounded system in period. The minimal property ensures
that we localize to the most specic socially enforced identities. The reliance
on identities instead of forms allows us to dene populations that never achieve
form status and to extend population denitions back to the period of early
legitimation. Research design implications follow.
Foundations of a Theory of Social Forms
Introduction
In many areas of central interest, contemporary sociologists invoke the concept
of form. For example, in analyzing French collective action across four centuries,
Tilly (1986) describes the \forms of contention" that arose and spread through
the provinces. These include seizures of grain; collective invasions of forbidden
elds, forest and streams; attacks on machines; serenades; tendentious holi-
day parades; forced illuminations; turnouts; strikes; demonstrations; petition
marches; planned insurrections, and electoral campaigns. Likewise, in develop-
ing a sociology of art, Becker (1982) characterizes various activities involving
works of music, literature, lm, television, sculpture, painting, and photography
as \art forms." In organizational sociology, all major theorists occupy them-
selves in one way or another with \organizational forms," often used to describe
established ways of producing most specic goods and services.
What exactly is a form? What roles do forms play in sociological theories?
Despite the centrality of the concept in the research literatures on organizations,
collective action, art, and culture, surprisingly little attention has been paid to
clarifying these questions. Although ambiguity about the meaning of such a
key concept might have been useful at early, exploratory stages of inquiry, it
now hampers eorts to sharpen theoretically driven research programs; it also
likely thwarts attempts at theoretical unication across disparate areas of the
discipline.
This paper addresses this deciency. We develop the foundations for a new
general approach to social forms. We think that such work can clarify and
organize many of the ideas invoked by the form concept. It might also stimulate
theories in other areas of sociological study where the form concept might be
useful.
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Although more abstract than entities such as artistic movements or bureau-
cracies, social forms are routinely identied by persons and corporate actors.
Indeed, most treatments of forms emphasize their socially constructed nature.
So, in dening forms of organizations or other social entities, the conceptual
apparatus should build toward theories that would provide empirically testable
answers to the question: What do social agents recognize when they \see" a
form; or, more precisely, how do they identify form boundaries? That is, the
conceptual apparatus should be capable of supporting theories that reect the
ways in which social agents distinguish forms.
This complicated task becomes all the more diÆcult if the framework nds
expression in \natural" language. Foundations would be far more secure if they
rested on a formal language that minimizes ambiguity. Use of such a language
1
We can imagine theoretical constructions such as the following being useful: forms of
ethnicity, medicine, religion, etc.
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for this purpose has other advantages as well. It permits checks on consistency,
allowing us to learn whether the various substructures of the foundation interre-
late felicitously. The abstraction gained in the translation to a formal language
also eases the task of using the same ideas in social contexts outside the realm
of organizational analysis, where we concentrate our current eorts. Even when
labeled otherwise, form ideas gure prominently in analyses of such diverse phe-
nomena as social protest, governance, contracting, and kinship. We attempt to
construct the language so that it is useful in these, and other, contexts.
In recent sociological literature, the techniques of rational reconstruction and
logical formalization have been used to reconstruct and improve the argumenta-
tive structure of theories. This paper, though also based on formal logic, diers
in two important ways. First, instead of explicating existing texts of theoretical
ideas, we draw on the research experiences of others and ourselves in examining
social form distinctions made in the real world. We try to identify the processes
that underlie these distinctions and construct a formal representation of the
processes at work and the resulting distinctions in social forms.
The second dierence concerns the formal machinery. Systematic analysis
in sociology invariably employs the tools of rst-order logic (including classical
mathematics). We think that this choice will not do here. As we explain in
some detail, we build notions of identity and form on the applicability of certain
social codes. Expressing the codes requires a rst-order language. Dening
identities and forms in terms of predicates relating to the applicability of codes
therefore requires a second-order language, one that allows quantication over
sentences (formul) of the language, not merely over the objects in the universe
of discourse (as in a rst-order language). Moreover, we depart from other
recent logical formalizations of sociological theories by paying explicit attention
both to syntax and semantics, as we also explain below. For these two reasons,
the formal structure we build departs extensively from convention.
The real test of the value of foundational work is whether it proves useful
in building specic theories{a task primarily for future eorts. Nonetheless,
some insight into potential value can be gained now by learning whether the
revised foundations suggest changes in current research practice. We try to
show that the scheme that we develop leads to rethinking of the basic unit
in much sociological research: populations. We argue that the new scheme
demands changes in the denition of population and in research practices in
identifying populations empirically.
Forms in Organizational Theory and Research
Although we intend our approach to be general, it is helpful to focus on an area
of application to give a sense of the motivations for our approach. We consider
organizational sociology, where the notion of form has long held center stage.
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Denitions of Organizational Forms
If any approach to dening organizational forms can be regarded as the stan-
dard, it is one that regards forms as particular clusters of features. The par
excellence example is Weber's (1924) specication of rational-legal bureaucracy
in terms of the nature of authority (professional expertise in evaluating abstract
rationalized codes), procedures (impersonal exercise of authority and reliance
on written rules and les), and the employment relation of the oÆcial (bu-
reaucratic employment as a career of full-time work, oÆce separated from the
private sphere, and compensation by salary). Weber introduced his specication
of rational-legal bureaucracy as an ideal type, meaning among other things that
he had abstracted from the historical details in identifying the properties that
dene the form. Nonetheless, it was crucial to Weber's analysis|and it is to our
approach|that the rational-legal form was instantiated in real organizations.
For instance, Weber sought to capture the essential properties of the bureau-
cratic organizations of the late 19th-century Prussian state. Yet, he noted that
the form was not limited to its Prussian instance; for instance, he argued that
the civil-service bureaus created by the Progressive reform movements in the
United States in the rst decades of the twentieth century also t the form. In
the language of contemporary theory, the Prussian and American instances are
two populations with the common form of rational-legal bureaucracy.
Subsequent developments of the feature-based conception recognize some
features as more important than others in distinguishing forms. In this vein,
analysts utilize the distinction between core and periphery and have identied
forms with a set of core features. That is, organizations displaying the same core
features are treated as belonging to the same form. Various analysts' notions of
form dier mainly in envisioning dierent sets of features in the core.
The various feature-based approaches treat form distinctions as reecting
only structural arrangements, meaning that forms can be assessed in purely
technical terms. Such a possibility can now be realized in the study of biotic
evolution. Organizational sociology seems unlikely to reach such a position, be-
cause distinctions among forms appear to reect social processes of boundary
creation. This possibility has been explored in a second, less developed, line of
work that denes forms in terms of the clarity and strength of social boundaries.
Hannan and Freeman (1986) argued that the processes that create and repro-
duce the boundaries|social network ties, closed ows of personnel among a set
of organizations, technological discontinuities, social movements articulating the
interests of a set of organizations, and so forth|are the key to understanding
forms. When these processes operate strongly and dominate the processes that
blur forms, then the world of organizations is organized by forms.
DiMaggio (1986) proposed a similar approach, based on nding structural
equivalence in ow networks [see also Burt (1993)]. Structural equivalence par-
titions a set of entities into equivalence classes that might be argued to represent
forms. This proposal would actually dene a population in our framework, be-
cause it pertains to a localized set of interacting entities. Forms, as we construe
them, are more abstract entities; they potentially extend over space and time.
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Nonetheless, bringing network ideas into the picture is a very valuable step. So,
we follow this lead. That is, our proposed denition of forms can be built in
terms of network ties or other kinds of relational properties, such a position in
a distribution of size or status.
Roles of Forms
In our view, the form concept plays three major roles in organizational the-
ory and research. First, researchers use notions of form to dene populations
for study. In the typical framework, localized sets of actors having the same
form constitute a population. Much recent research conducts analysis on pop-
ulations of organizations so dened, including research on populations as art
museums (Blau 1995), audit rms (Boone, Brocheler, and Carroll 2000), banks
(Barnett and Hansen 1996; Lomi 2000), baseball teams (Land, Davis, and Blau
1994), brewers (Carroll and Swaminathan 1992; 1998), credit unions (Barron
1999), ethnic and women's social-movement organizations (Minko 1999), in-
vestment banks (Park and Podolny 1999), newspapers (Olzak and West 1991;
Dobrev 1999), semiconductor manufacturers (Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan
1995), symphony orchestras (Allmendinger and Hackman 1996), television sta-
tions (Srensen 2000), wineries (Swaminathan 1995), and worker cooperatives
(Russell 1995). The value of such research depends heavily on the populations'
studied representing instances of meaningfully specied forms.
In its second common role, form refers to a particular conguration of prop-
erties. Examples include the multi-divisional or M-form (Williamson 1975) and
the network form of organization (Podolny and Page 1998). In many cases, ana-
lysts have drawn attention to these particular congurations on the assumption
that the form in question has some special adaptive advantage over others.
The examples of the M-form and network form illustrate yet another mean-
ing of form: structural architecture. Architecture and form generally refer to
dierent kinds of properties. Forms relate to identity, and architectures are
rarely decisive for identity. In particular, architectures often vary considerably
within forms. For instance, M-forms can be found in some, but not all, rms
in many populations. Second, organizations also routinely change architectures
without changing their identities. So, without denigrating the importance of
architecture, we insist that it be distinguished from form.
The third common role of the form concept serves to dierentiate between
core and peripheral features. According to inertia theory (Hannan and Freeman
1984; Barnett and Carroll 1995), changing a core feature exposes an organization
to great risk of mortality, but change in peripheral features does not. According
to this theory, the core features are those that regulate form membership. Clear
and detailed specications of forms are needed to test such an argument.
In perhaps the most serious limitation, current denitions fail to link forms
and identities. If forms are not architectures, then they presumably involve so-
cial and cultural typications, agreed-upon classications of entities into types.
Our eorts to understand such typications in empirical research on diverse
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kinds of organizations leads us to suggest that such processes build upon iden-
tities. So we seek to dene identity and form in closely related terms.
An Approach to Forms
We think that systems of classication of forms will have most sociological
value if they build on a theory of action. We suggest that forms be considered
as recognizable patterns that take on rule-like standing and get enforced by
social agents. Our choice of language for expressing this idea deserves some
discussion. We want to use a term whose denotation and connotation include
both cognitive recognition and imperative standing. When we formulated these
issues in terms of social and cultural rules, we found that he connotation of
articulated regulation is so strong that the cognitive dimension gets slighted.
So we use the notion of code, which can be understood as both (1) a set of
signals, as in the genetic code, and (2) a set of rules of conduct, as in the penal
code. Our use of \code" reects both meanings.
We begin by stating a formal language, using set theory and logic. We deploy
these tools along with some standard sociological notions about code violation
and identity. We surely do not claim originality for the basic ideas. We do think
that the reformulation lends a new crispness to the old ideas.
The language must contain the elemental building blocks for identities and
forms. As in the feature-based conception of form, features are central to our
denition of form. As in the network-based conception, relations are also central.
These relations might involve actual social ties; or they might represent resource
dependencies or relative structural positions. For simplicity, we will refer to both
features and relations as properties.
We introduce a language for expressing properties as well as constraints
on properties. We represent properties as functions. Let v denote a set of
possible values of a property, say the alternative forms of authority, o the set of
objects, here social entities such as organizations, collective actions, contracts,
and so forth, and p the set of time periods. A property, f(o; ), is a function
f : o p! v. Such functions take an entity and a period and give the values
of the properties.
Identities and Codes
The idea that forms should be grounded in identities raises a vexing question:
What provides the basis of identity in the kinds of worlds we are considering?
One standard answer says that identity inheres in the constancy of a set of
properties. For instance, Leibniz's rule states that two objects are identical if
and only if they possess exactly the same properties. This rule makes sense as a
way of specifying identities for so-called extensional objects, those for whom all
properties are xed. Social entities, however, are intensional, their properties
can change over time; and, some changes do not disrupt identity. So there is no
5
point in looking for social identity in constancy.
2
We reach the unavoidable conclusion that neither the actual values of the
properties nor the properties themselves can be the carriers of identity. What,
then, do social entities preserve when they maintain their identities? In short,
they satisfy constraints. An identity constrains what an entity would/could be
and what is expected and not expected of it. On the formal side, this idea
can be expressed as positing that entities are described in terms of social codes
relating to properties and constraints over properties.
Because we want to bring network position and other relational properties
into the framework, we make what might seem to be an odd strategic choice. We
dene the properties that support identity broadly as including even properties
involving the entity itself. We do so because sentences about network proper-
ties refer to the presence and absence of ties of the focal entity with others. For
example, forms of contention require relational ties among contenders, oppo-
nents and others: \each of these forms of action links some concrete group of
people to some other individual, group or groups. Each originates and changes
as a function of continuing interaction|struggle, collaboration, competition, or
some combination of them|among groups" (Tilly 1986: 4). If formal sentences
for such images are to be well formed, both ego and alter must be included in
the set of objects to which the sentences refer.
If properties are dened as functions, then each property has a range, a set
of possible values. For instance, organizational status, which can range over the
positive numbers, has a broad range; but the form of ownership, which includes
only a modest number of values, e.g., proprietorship, partnership, collective
ownership, state ownership, and shareholder ownership, has a narrow range.
Many relational properties will obviously have very wide ranges.
The feasible values of a property should be distinguished from the values
allowed by social codes. The feasible sets might usefully be taken as given in
analyzing identity, because they are set by considerations that depend neither
upon the actual entities under consideration nor on the codes dening their
identities. For instance, some properties face technical constraints. Widespread
availability of inexpensive information technology has increase the range of pro-
duction possibilities, e.g., the option of marketing and selling products over the
Internet was not in the feasible set until recently. Other properties face con-
straint from laws and general cultural rules, e.g., slave labor is now excluded in
most societies from the set of options for the form of the relationship between
the corporate entity and its members. Some identity-related restrictions go be-
yond the technological and legal constraints. At the extreme, an identity allows
only one value for a particular property (an indispensable property), in which
case an entity cannot change the value of this property without risking loss of
2
It might be tempting to try to nesse this issue by conceptualizing identity in terms of
some temporal functions dened on the properties. Unfortunately, such identication would
require complete knowledge of the property values at every time point. Even full knowledge of
an entity's past would not be enough. One also has to know its future to provide a satisfying
denition of identity in terms of the time path of properties. Polos (1999) discusses the
technical details.
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its identity.
Some restrictions that support identity have a conditional nature. Think of
an identity that allows multiple values for each of two properties but requires
that certain combinations not be allowed. For instance, the property of broker-
age requires that an entity have ties to two or more other entities that are not
directly tied. Each of these elements of identity can be expressed in terms of
constraints.
3
Aspects of a code might appear in recorded format. Modern legal codes
tend to develop this explicit nature. Similarly, some of the cultural code that
regulates forms of art might be recorded. But, most of the code regulating
social behavior appears to be implicit and unrecorded, except perhaps by social
critics. In a broad class of situations, researchers can only learn about the codes
from the actions social actors take when they observe code violation.
Explicit codes are sometimes well preserved over centuries, even in the ab-
sence of any enforcement mechanisms. For instance, one can still read the legal
codes of Hamurabbi. Implicit codes, on the other hand, are more fragile, and,
in the absence of enforcement mechanism, they tend to vanish.
Since most social code is a composition of implicit and explicit codes, the
reconstruction of social codes from the explicit part might be problematic. This
might be responsible for the common diÆculty people have with recalling obso-
lete cultural forms.
A Language for Coded Identities
Now we consider the common characteristics of these constraints to provide a
formal denition of social identity. Each type of constraint mentioned above can
be constructed from sentences (or formul) of a formal language.
4
A companion
paper (Polos, Hannan, and Carroll 1999) provides a complete formal denition
of the proposed language. Here we sketch the main ideas informally.
As we see it, a useful formal language for identities and forms must connect
two
5
semantic domains that refer to dierent ways of assessing the relation
between entities (social actors) and coded constraints. The rst holds that the
entity is perceived as satisfying the constraint, and the second holds that the
constraint operates as a default for the entity.
3
Constraints circumscribe acceptable behavior in terms of ranges within which properties
have to lie. This is often explained in conditional form. Our use of the notion of constraints
was inspired by Barwise and Perry (1999) even though we did not adopt their formalism to
represent constraints.
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In formal terms, the language of constraints is a rst-order language, which means that
it allows quantication only over the objects in the domain of discourse. Our formulation
makes statements that quantify over the sentences/formul of this language. Therefore, it
is a second-order formulation. Whenever we clarify certain ideas by formal means, we use a
second-order language.
5
It might prove useful in some applications and extensions of these ideas to add a third
semantic domain that concerns whether an entity actually satises a constraint, that is, obeys
the code. As this idea is not needed here, we do not introduce the third semantic in this
paper.
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The social-perception domain refers to the world of perceived objects and
to the properties they are perceived to possess. The rst semantics for our
language provides meanings for such sentences or formul. To indicate this, we
use the symbol p as a subscript. The truth value of a sentence expressing a code
refers to perceived facts, whether a particular object is perceived as satisfying
the code: [[]]
p
, where the subscript p indicates that the truth value is evaluated
in terms of the perceived facts of the case: whether a code is perceived to be
satised. It is easy to see that this semantic domain requires a partial truth-
value assignment. Certain statements are perceived to be true, some others are
perceived to be false; but some statements might not be perceived as either true
or false.
In the domain of defaults, truth values follow the following rule: If a code
is a default for an entity, then the entity is assumed to satisfy the code unless
there is evidence to the contrary that over-rules this default. We denote the
default truth value of any sentence expressing a code, , by [[]]
d
, where the
subscript indicates that the truth value of the sentence is evaluated according
to the default semantics. If the sentence  is true for a particular entity, then
the default truth value of the sentence equals one when the entity variable is
\substituted" by the name of this object.
Two relations between these semantic domains deserve note. First, defaults
\ll gaps" in perception. Social perception is by nature partial: it might be
that the violation of a particular code is not perceived. If perception matters,
then it is important to nd ways how the absence of perception can be elimi-
nated. We assume that actors treat the default codes as being satised between
events of perception (since there is no evidence on satisfaction between such
events,). Second, we assume that a code is a default for an entity if observed
code violations have observable consequences for the entity. We will model these
consequences in terms of a sudden drop in the valuation of the entity. In these
terms, the relation between the perceptual semantics and the default semantics
can be expressed as follows. A code is a default for an entity if the perceived
violation of this code results in a sudden drop in valuation.
We extend these notions by dening a set of predicates to be used in den-
ing social identities and forms. These predicates tie the semantics and the
syntactical elements of our conceptual scheme. First, we dene a predicated for
perceived satisfaction using the semantics of social perception:
Denition 1 (Perception of code satisfaction)
Object ! is perceived as satisfying code  at the time point  :
P
S
(!; ;  ) ! [[()]
p
= 1;
object ! is perceived as not satisfying code  at  :
P
:S
(!; ;  ) ! [()]]
p
= 0;
object ! is not perceived as satisfying code  at  :
:P
S
(!; ;  ) ! ([[()]]
p
= 0 _ [[()]]
p
= 2);
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object ! is not perceived as not satisfying code  at  :
:P
:S
(!; ;  ) ! ([[()]
p
= 1 _ [[()]
p
= 2):
Second, we dene default code status, D(!; ; ), which reads as \code  is
a default for object ! in period ." We dene this predicate with reference to
the default truth value.
Denition 2 (Default code) Code  is a default for object ! in period :
D(!; ; ) ! [[]]
d
= 1:
These denitions yield the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The semantics of perceived satisfaction gives the undened value, the
truth value gap, if neither satisfaction nor non-satisfaction is perceived.
6
:P
:S
(!; ; ) ^:P
S
(!; ; ) ! [()]]
p
= 2:
Now we can spell out the formal relation among these semantic domains:
Postulate 1 If a code is a default and possible non-satisfaction is not perceived, it
is just as good as if the satisfaction had been perceived.
D(!; ; ) ^ :P
:S
(!; ; )  ! P
S
(!; ; ):
(Note that this is exactly how defaults are used in computation.)
Code Violations and Valuations
We need some principle for separating actual, socially meaningful identities from
potential identities. We build on the idea that real identities come to have a rule-
like status. This means that the identities consist of codes with the property
that violations of defaults have observable consequences (Meyer and Rowan
1977; Becker 1982; Jepperson 1991). The -valuation function introduced below
tells the direction and strength of the social approval of an entity in terms of
its perceived satisfaction of applicable codes.
Understanding how normative judgments by agents combine to create, sus-
tain, and apply codes is a fundamental problem in the social sciences. We do
not pretend to oer a general solution to this problem. The framework we pro-
pose conforms with most relevant theory: it requires simply that such codes
come into existence and that controllers of valued resources use these codes
6
The partial nature of the perceptual semantics all us to give a formal semantics for default
in a classical manner (Polos, Hannan, and Carroll 1999). An alternative approach, using a
nonmonotonic logic can be found in Polos, Hannan, and Kamps (1999).
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in granting and withholding access to the resources. We imagine that the de-
tails vary enormously for dierent identities (and forms) and among systems.
7
The processes that translate individual judgments into consequences for actors
presumably dier across cases (DiMaggio 1997). Indeed, sometimes dierent
groups of evaluators impose dierent and possibly inconsistent constraints on
an identity such that a given action is viewed positively by one set and neg-
atively by the other. Although such identities are fragile and are unlikely to
be sustained, the case of conicting demands needs attention. But, we do not
attend to these complications here; we simply assert that certain social codes
exist and get enforced, without specifying who does the enforcing and how.
We want to express formally the idea that violation of a social code after a
period of conformity lowers an entity's valuation precipitously. However, viola-
tion has negative consequences only when the entities controlling consequences
treat the code in question as a default for the entity. The issue of applicabil-
ity complicates the job of uncovering codes. We do not want to assume that
a researcher already knows all relevant social codes. Suppose that an analyst
comes across an entity that does not conform to some expected code-like pat-
tern. Should she conclude that this unusual entity violates a social code? We
think that the answer to this question is No, because the entity might satisfy
another|yet unknown|code. To accommodate this complication, we suggest
relying on a more limited test. This test focuses on a set of entities that con-
forms to what might be a social code and examines the consequences of an
entity's violating the possible code after a period of perceived conformity. If an
observed violation of the code after a period of conformity causes evaluations
to drop sharply, then we conclude that we have identied a social code.
8
This reasoning holds even when an entity changes in a way that leads to
perception violation of one social code but perceived satisfaction of another code
that it did not satisfy previously, e.g., an organization departs from its long-
standing tradition and switches to a currently fashionable design. In this case,
the entity does not satisfy a social code for only a vanishingly small interval.
Yet, the violation of the former code should be costly. The matter turns on
what codes are defaults. If the entity has an observed history of conforming
to a code, then the relevant evaluators ordinarily come to treat this code as
a default. Hence, the shift to conformity with some other code does, in the
example, constitute a violation.
So the next step is to dene a predicate for code violation, V (!; ; ), which
reads as \entity ! violated code  during the innitesimally short period ."
7
For instance, Becker (1982) identies consensus among art-world participants as
paramount, especially those recognized as experts. He also claims that art works must be
justied in terms of a logically coherent and defensible set of aesthetic principles. With re-
spect to forms of contention, Tilly (1986) argues that two main sources have to do with the
peculiarities of capitalist development and of concentration of political authority. Hannan and
Freeman (1986) contend that organizational forms arise from various segregating processes.
8
If codes and their applicationare known, then violation can be dened irrespective of prior
observed conformity. We introduce the special restriction here only because we are considering
common situations in which the researcher might not know codes.
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Denition 3 (Code violation) Entity ! violates a code, , in the time interval 
if the code is a default for the entity and there are two time points ; 
0
such that
the entity is perceived as satisfying the code or is not perceived as not satisfying it
in any time interval within  prior to  , but is perceived as failing to satisfy it in
[; 
0
)  .
V (!; ; ) ! 9; 
0
; 

(  ) ^ ([; 
0
)  ) ^D(!; ; ) ^
8
00
[([
00
;  )  ) ^ (P
S
(!; ; [
00
;  )) _ :P
:S
(!; ; [
00
;  ))) ^ P
:S
(!; ; [; 
0
))]

:
(Here, as elsewhere in the paper,  is a variable that ranges over innitesimally
short intervals, as contrasted with  which ranges over longer intervals. We
assume that the expression [; 
0
) is well formed only if  < 
0
.)
According to this denition, all that matters is whether the code is a default
for an entity and whether the entity is perceived as failing to satisfy it. It follows
from this approach that violation of a code usually prompts an evaluator to shift
from automatic cognition to deliberative cognition (DiMaggio 1997).
Many social entities, such as organizations, protest actions, and artistic
schools, are composed of members who are themselves actors. So, in general,
we want to consider cases in which entities face evaluation by both insiders and
outsiders. The various kinds of evaluators might have dierent perspectives and
might impose dierent, perhaps conicting, demands. At this stage of develop-
ment of the conceptual framework, we elide most dierences and assume that
evaluations can be meaningfully aggregated within each of two sets of actors:
insiders and outsiders.
Valuation can involve all sorts of social reactions based upon identity. For
instance, it can involve judgments by members about whether a corporate actor
remains faithful to its traditions and culture. Valuation can also mean the
literal calculation of pecuniary value in the sense that investors in stock markets
explicitly or implicitly make calculations of the expected value of rms. When
these expectations involve conformity of forms with certain coded identities,
then the process we are discussing is relevant to the denition of identities.
Zuckerman (1999) documents such a process in the world of securities analysts,
employees of stock brokerages who follow industries and rms and make forward-
looking assessments of the stock market prospects of rms. These valuations
depend upon a variety of objective and subjective measures of performance.
Zuckerman also shows that they depend upon the conformity of the rms with
the category schemes used by the analysts. Firms that operate in markets and
industries that do not fall in one of the analysts' categories are less likely to be
followed by analysts. This reduces their attractiveness to investors, and their
stock market returns fall accordingly.
Similarly, Becker (1982: 135) shows that the classications of aestheticians
and critics aect artists and their activities: \whether free-form jazz is really
jazz and whether fashion photographs are really photography and therefore
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art, are discussions, among other things, about whether people who play free-
form jazz can perform in jazz clubs for existing audiences and whether fashion
photographs can be exhibited and sold in important galleries and museums."
These artistic valuations aect material rewards essential to the production of
art, intangible benets that shape careers, and even the life and death of whole
genres.
One important class of valuation pertains to judgments about the social
worth of an identity, such as the distinction between high-brow and low-brow
art forms. We focus on a dierent kind of valuation, one that depends upon judg-
ments about whether a social entity follows the relevant default codes. (Even
critics who nd little artistic value in a genre can make judgments about the
degree to which an artist or an art work conforms to the rule of the genre.) We
refer to such judgments as -valuations, for short. The agents need not be able
to articulate fully the bases of their valuations. Becker (1982: 199) observes
that \artists nd it diÆcult to verbalize the general principles on which they
make their choices. They often resort to such noncommunicative statements as
`it sounds better that way,' `it looked good to me,' or `it works'."
Of course, such valuations might reect legal or regulatory codes and their
enforcement. State authorities, professional bodies, and other collective actors
frequently enact formal rules that govern identities, especially in the case of
organizations. For instance, the world of American nancial-service organiza-
tions was sharply constrained by regulation for roughly fty years in the middle
of this century, with legal codes stipulating a set of allowed combinations and
forbidding other combinations (such as combining commercial banking and in-
vestment banking in the same organization).
We introduce -valuation functions pertaining the judgments of insiders and
outsiders. Although it would be extremely important in empirical research
to measure these functions directly, we simplify here by concentrating on the
changes in valuations over a period. Because we want to consider punishment of
deviations, we single out situations in which valuations drop substantially and
instantaneously. We represent this idea as follows. Let 
i
(!; ; ) mean that
the insider -valuation function for object !, with respect to code , dropped
substantially in instantaneous period ; and let 
e
(!; ; ) do the same for
external valuation.
9
We use the -valuation functions to dene predicates that tell that a code is
socially enforced: SCI(!; ) reads as \the sentence  is an internal social code
in period ," and SCE(!; ) is dened similarly for external identity.
Denition 4 (Social code enforced internally/externally) An internally (exter-
nally) enforced social code is a default code whose perceived violation causes a
9
If big changes in the -valuation of an identity can take place instantaneously, then -
valuations of identities do not serve as a basis for potentially stable social identities. So, we
make the seemingly reasonable assumption that -valuation functions change smoothly over
brief intervals for entities that are perceived to satisfy their default codes over the subinterval.
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discontinuous drop in an entity's -valuation by insiders (outsiders).
SCI(; ) ! 8!; 

D(!; ; ) ^ V (!; ; ) ^ (  )! 
i
(!; ; )

:
SCE(; ) ! 8!; 

D(!; ; ) ^ V (!; ; ) ^ (  )! 
e
(!; ; )

:
The two types of codes might disagree. Perhaps nowhere do the dierences
between insiders and outsiders become so visible as with art forms, where works
that belie the external public's common-sense view of art at the same time gain
high esteem within insider artistic circles. Becker (1982: 146) describes such
divergence in discussing Marcel Duchamp's exhibitions of a signed shovel and a
signed urinal:
The common-sense critique of these works is that anyone could have
done, that they require no skill or insight, that they do not imitate
anything in nature because they are nature, that they do not express
anything interesting because they are no more than commonplace
objects. The critique of those with ner sensibilities is much the
same. Nevertheless, those works gained great renown in the world
of contemporary visual art, inspiring many more like them.
A Formal Denition of Social Identity
We move from social codes to social identities in two steps to make the analytic
strategy clear. First, we collect and name all of default social codes for an actor.
We want to reduce the identity to its core, stripping away incidental features
that might be attached. We achieve this by dening the building blocks of social
identity. It will simplify things to separate the ingredients of internal identity
(bi) and external identity (be).
Social identities, which can potentially be separated from particular carriers,
should be dened abstractly. But, we want to ensure that we are working with
tangible codes, those that actually serve as defaults for some entities for at
least some of the relevant period. Therefore, we start by dening the tangible
building blocks.
Denition 5 (Tangible building blocks for identity)
bi
!;
= fjSCI(; ) ^D(!; ; )g ;
be
!;
= fjSCE(; ) ^D(!; ; )g :
Note that the D predicates tie the codes to entities in these formul.
Next, we free the building blocks from the carriers. Certain identities might
exist even when no actual entity carries them. It is suÆcient that there was an
entity that carried this identity. But, enforcement mechanisms for an identity do
not last forever. If no one is subject to a code, then its enforcement mechanism
weakens and eventually vanishes. We can characterize the pharaoh's identity
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even though there are no pharaohs; but the Pharaoh code lacks means of en-
forcement. We represent these considerations by introducing a parameter, ,
that tells how long it takes for an empty identity to lose its rule-like status
and thus its enforcement. Let () denote the length of period . We imple-
ment the idea that enforcement of an identity code dissipates if the identity is
continuously vacant for () > .
Denition 6 (Abstract building blocks for identity) .
bi
[
1
;
2
)
=

x j 9!; 

(
1
<   
2
) ^ x 2 bi
!;[t
1
;t)

^
:9

  [
1
; 
2
) ^ (() > ) ^ 8
0
; ! [
0
 ! x 62 bi
!;
0
]

;
be
[
1
;
2
)
=

x j 9!; 

(
1
<   
2
) ^ x 2 be
!;[
1
;)

^
:9

  [
1
; 
2
) ^ (() > ) ^ 8
0
; ! [
0
 ! x 62 be
!;
0
]

:
These complicated constructions say the following: For some period, the ab-
stract building blocks for internal/external identity is the collection of those
elements that are part of the internal/external identity for some entity for at
least some time point within the interval as long as there is no subinterval longer
than  in which these elements are not part of the internal/external identity for
some entity.)
The second step in moving from codes to identities introduces composition
rules that combine building blocks in particular ways. Just as a recipe species
a sequence of combinations of ingredients along with operations on those ingre-
dients, an identity code imposes a pattern on the social codes that underlie the
identity. For instance, in forms of organization, organizational identities often
entail conditional constraints across the component codes, as we discuss below
for microbreweries and brewpubs. In forms of contention, given sequences of
activities come to be expected, as can be seen in Tilly's (1986: 394) description
of the French turnout:
Workers in a given craft who had a grievance against the employers
of their locality went from shop to shop within the locality, calling
out the workers to join them in a march around the town, ended the
circuit with a meeting at the edge of town, voted to make certain
set of demands, sent a delegation to the employers, declared a work
stoppage, and enforced it as best they could throughout the town
until they reached an agreement with the employers.
In forms of music, a variety of dierent factors apparently come into play. Con-
sider Peterson's (1997: 218) description of what it takes to produce the Ameri-
can country-music form:
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Music and performance are vital to the audience, but signiers are
also vital. The boots, the hat, the outt, a soft rural Southern
accent, as well as the sound and subjects of the songs, all help.
Finally, being able to show a family heritage in country music is
perhaps the strongest asset among authenticity claims. Many artists
recall learning rst from their mothers or playing in a family band.
A plausible interpretation of the widespread use of prototypes or templates
in business, art, and other domains is that they embody not only the feature
values inherent in a code, but also its composition rules. Prototypes are useful
in attempts to recreate or copy a code, especially when the composition rules
are tacit or, at least, not explicit.
We denote the composition rules for inside and outside identities as the
function  and 
0
.
Denition 7 (Tangible internal/external identity codes) A tangible internal (ex-
ternal) identity is a set with the property that each of its members is an internally
enforced composition of building blocks of identity for some entity.
iic
!;
= fj9A  bi
!;
^  = (A) ^ (A) 2 bi
!;
g ;
eic
!;
= fj9A  be
!;
^  = 
0
(A) ^ 
0
(A) 2 be
!;
g :
In each case, the ingredients used to build an identity are a subset of the full set
of ingredients. The formul state that a particular composition of the subsets
of ingredients is coded as an identity. So the social coding process can pay
attention to all or only to some of the ingredients in constructing identities. Note
that this denition stipulates that the composition|rather than the elements of
identity|that gets enforced. This property gives identity its unitary character.
Again, we free the codes from their carriers:
Denition 8 (Abstract internal/external identity codes) An internal (external)
identity is a set with the property that each of its members is an internally (exter-
nally) enforced composition of building blocks of internal (external) identity.
iic

= fj9A  bi

^  = (A) ^ (A) 2 bi

g ;
eic

= fj9A  be

^  = 
0
(A) ^ 
0
(A) 2 be

g :
An obvious step in developing the notion of code-based social identity con-
siders the consequence of violations:
Theorem 1 An observable violation of an internal (external) social identity causes
a discontinuous drop in an entity's -valuation by insiders (outsiders).
8!; ; ; 

((  ) ^  2 iic
!;
^ V (!; ; ))  ! 
i
(!; ; )

;
8!; ; ; 

((  ) ^  2 eic
!;
^ V (!; ; ))  ! 
e
(!; ; )

:
This theorem provides the analytical leverage needed to provide a denition of
social identity that can guide empirical research. It denes identities as those
that have rule-like status, viz., defecting from compliance with the code harms
the entity's valuation.
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Grading Identities
Social identities often form nestings. Of course, in any given context, it is
a matter for empirical research to document actual nesting patterns and to
identify the processes that generate them. For instance, we know that if an
organization has the identity \craft labor union," then it usually also has the
identity \labor union", but not vice versa). Thus, we would conclude that craft
union is a renement of the labor-union identity, that the former is a more
restrictive identity.
To dene the specicity ordering of codes, we need the following:
Denition 9 (Sharper relation) Code  is sharper than code 
0
in period ,  


0
, if  is a default then 
0
is a default and perceived satisfaction of  implies
perceived satisfaction of 
0
, but default status (perceived satisfaction) of 
0
does
not imply default status (perceived satisfaction) of .
( 


0
) ! 8![D(!; ; )! D(!; 
0
; ) ^ : (D(!; 
0
; )! D(!; ; ))
^P
S
(!; ; )! P
S
(!; 
0
; ) ^ : (P
S
(!; 
0
; )! P
S
(!; ; ))]:
Denition 10 (Ordering of tangible (internal/external) identity codes)
( 
ic;!


0
) ! (; 
0
2 iic
!;
_ ; 
0
2 eic
!;
) ^ ( 


0
)) :
We can dene, mutatis mutandis, orderings of abstract (internal/external) iden-
tity codes:
Denition 11 (Ordering of abstract (internal/external) identity codes)
( 
ic


0
) ! (; 
0
2 iic

_; 
0
2 eic

) ^ ( 


0
)) :
Of course, not all pairs of identities can be ordered by specicity, e.g., jazz and
country music.
It will be important in applying our framework to have an explicit denition
of the sharpest external identities that apply to an entity. We refer to identities
in the plural here because the lack of a hierarchical structure of identities allows
entities to have several identities each of which satises the property that no
other identity is sharper.
Denition 12 (Minimal external identities) eic
min
!;
is a minimal external iden-
tity for an entity in a period if it is an external identity for the entity and none of
the entity's other external identities is sharper.
eic
min
!;
=

(j 2 eic
!;
) ^ :9
0


0
2 eic
!;
^ ( 
ic;!


0
)
	
:
Note that an actor need not have a unique minimal identity.
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Forms
After reviewing the role of forms in diverse kinds of sociological arguments,
we concluded that forms could best play their assigned roles if forms are de-
ned as social identities that possess three properties. First, forms are built
from external identity codes. Identities might be established primarily|or even
exclusively|by evaluations of insiders: think of a secret society whose struc-
ture has avoided notice by outsiders. In contrast, forms are cultural objects
with broader signicance. As Becker (1982: 163) explains for art,
: : : in principle any object or action can be legitimated as art,
but : : : in practice every art world has procedures and rules govern-
ing legitimation which, while not clear-cut or foolproof, nevertheless
make the success of some candidates for the status of art very un-
likely. Those procedures and rules are contained in the conventions
and patterns of cooperation by which art worlds carry on their rou-
tine activities.
So we dene the default social codes to entities as the external identity codes.
(Of course, they might be enforced internally as well; but that is not required.)
Second, unlike identities, forms pertain to multiple entities. Sociologists
want forms to be patterns with broad reach. So we also add this requirement.
But, how broad must they be?
Here we take advantage of knowledge about density-dependent legitimation
processes (Hannan and Carroll 1992; Carroll and Hannan 2000). According to
this theory and research, external identities gain taken-for-granted status as a
consequence of growth in the number of actors with the identity. As this number
grows from zero, the constitutive legitimation of the identity increases to some
ceiling. In empirical research (that also species the other part of the theory
of density dependence concerning density and competition) we nd evidence
that the implied growth trajectories of legitimation with growing density vary
among identities. So we specify a form-specic application number, denoted as
() which gives the number of entities to which a social identity must apply
for the identity to gain the standing of form.
Third, forms last longer than ordinary identities. Recall that we dened
abstract identities as having the capacity to persist for a period of length () =
 even when vacant. To represent the idea that forms have greater persistence,
we assume that they can be enforced after much longer periods of vacancy,
() = , where  is much larger than .
These three considerations motivate the following denition:
Denition 13 (Form) A form is a default external identity code for at least ()-
many dierent entities at the beginning of a period and the length of the maximal
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sub-period within which  is not an external identity of any entity is below .
(; [
1
; 
2
)) ! 9

(
1
<   
2
) ^
 
() 



! j  2 eic
!;[
1
;)
	




^
:9

  [
1
; 
2
) ^ (() > ) ^ 8
0
; !


0
  !  62 eic
!;
0


:
This denition relies on the construction of the set

!j 2 eic
!;[
1
;)
	
. This is
the set of entities for whom the code  is part of their external set of identities
eic
!;
. We use the standard notation for the cardinality of a set j  j; the
cardinality is the number of distinct objects in a set. The denition says that
 can be a form only when the number of such entities is at least as great as
().
This denition allows for the possibility that forms can become empty for
a time without the relevant codes changing. Under such circumstances, the
external enforcement is obviously counterfactual.
10
We do this by requiring
that the () condition be satised for some (half-open) interval, [
1
;  ), where

1
is the starting point of the time interval under consideration. Even if the
number of entities that satisfy the external identity condition drops below ()
(perhaps even reaching zero) after  , the form still exists for the remainder
of the interval. This construction leaves it to the researcher to determine the
appropriate width of the interval, depending on the context. We imagine that
the width of an appropriate interval for artistic forms might be considerably
wider than for organizational forms.
An empirical illustration helps to show what it means for a form to persist
during a period of inactivity. Carroll and Swaminathan (1998) plotted the
number of rms (density) in the population of American brewers over the history
of the population. The density falls to zero in 1920 with the onset of the
national Prohibition and stays at zero until 1934, the year following the end
of Prohibition. Interestingly, the level and trend in density after Prohibition
is what one would have expected if the trend to 1920 had been continued and
there was no Prohibition. The form seems to have been unaected by the many
years of inactivity. For another example, see Dobrev's (1999) analysis of the
evolution of the population of newspapers in Bulgaria over regimes of free and
highly regulated press.
To complete the framework, we tie forms to entities using the predicate
F(!; ; ):
Denition 14 (Default classication) An object is classied as subject to a form
if the codes specifying the form apply to it by default:
F(!; ; ) ! (; ) ^D(!; ; ):
10
This situation can be paraphrased as follows: Had there been a violation of the form-
dening constraints, the violator would have been expelled from the form and would have to
face all of the consequences.
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Form membership, as we dene it, does not imply that a default member ac-
tually conforms to the codes specifying the form. Rather, it means that these
codes are defaults. It should be noted that classication can be unintended
or undesired. As with identities generally, form classication gets externally
conferred.
Our conceptual scheme yields the following result as a theorem:
Theorem 2 If a social entity violates the code that species a form to which it is
classied, then its valuation by outsiders drops sharply.
8!; ; 

(F(!; ; )^ (  ) ^ V (!; ; ))  ! 
e
(!; ; )

:
Subforms
Form distinctions are ordinarily partially nested, because identities are partially
nested and forms are special kinds of identities. Social worlds sometimes contain
sets of forms that have subforms that, in turn, have subforms, and so forth. Such
a hierarchical arrangement allows the set of social codes to take an especially
simple form. Hierarchical systems can be easily comprehended (DiMaggio 1997).
Code violations can be seen clearly and, therefore, can be punished easily in such
a world.
The key property for conceptualizing hierarchical relations among forms is
the subform relation, which we denote by 


. (The subscript  indicates that
the subform relation might be period-specic.) This subform relation is the
sharper relation (

) applied to forms. This means that subforms are more
constrained than the forms that they specialize.
Denition 15 (Subform) Suppose that 
1
and 
2
are forms in period : (
1
; ),
and (
2
; ). Then 
1
is a subform of 
2
i 
1
is sharper than 
2
:
(
1




2
) ! ((
1



2
) ^(
1
; ) ^(
2
; )) :
We close this section with a theorem concerning the nesting of forms, as we
dene them.
Theorem 3 Default form classication propagates upward: default classication in
a subform of a form implies default classication in that form.
8
1
; 
2
; !; 
 
(
1




2
) ^ F(!; 
1
; )

 ! F(!; 
2
; )

:
Clarifying the Status of Populations
The notion of population plays a central role in social research. Nearly all
researchers, inuenced by statistical formulations, claim to make inferences to
some population. But, populations are often dened opportunistically, with
availability of data determining the bounds of the entity; and the concept of
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population as a sociological idea is poorly articulated. White (1992: 17) refers
to the mainstream sociological conception of population as the \bag of beans"
view. As long as the population concept remains underdeveloped, the link
between abstract theory and systematic empirical research remains tenuous.
We think that the formal language we are proposing can help to remedy this
situation. This section sketches a theoretical conception of population that
builds on notions of socially enforced identities.
The most sustained attention to population in sociology comes from the eco-
logical tradition. There populations are dened as bounded sets of entities with
a common form (Hawley 1968; Hannan and Freeman 1977). Populations are
limited by some social-system boundary, which reects barriers to the opera-
tions of relevant social processes such as the ow of information, competition,
and regulation. Getting this part of the specication right is crucial for den-
ing a population in our scheme. In this respect, nothing has changed from
the usual standard in ecological research. However, our proposed conception of
forms leads us to depart from the conventions of this approach. These depar-
tures reect the insight gained from the formalization that points to a way to
eliminate two ambiguities in the conventional ecological denition of population,
not noted previously.
The rst ambiguity arises because the codes that specify identities and forms
are generally partially nested. An entity for which the social code specifying
a particular external identity is also subject to the defaults for any higher-
level identity in the nesting. Which of the many possible sets are meaningful
populations? A useful denition of population must provide clear guidance on
this issue.
There seems to be widespread agreement that population denitions have
most value for theory and research when they pertain to the most specic ex-
ternal (sub)identity applicable to an entity. The whole point of dening and
identifying populations is to allow analysis of local social structures and the
interactions they entail. A useful specication of a population should single
out a set of entities that are expected to interact strongly both because they
fall within the same system boundary and they share a common, highly-specic
external identity. This reasoning motivates the rst important departure from
the standard approach: we dene populations in terms of minimal external
identities|not forms.
The second ambiguity concerns the theoretical standing of population at in-
ception when populations are dened in terms of forms. It is helpful in thinking
about this issue to consider working backward through the history of a pop-
ulation. As we move backward in the history, we eventually reach the point
at which the population-dening form takes hold in the culture. Then imag-
ine pushing the history back further, continuing to the point at which we see
the rst known entity that satises the rule that eventually becomes a form.
This is not a purely imaginary exercise. Most contemporary research on the
evolution of populations of organizations tries to push observations back to this
kind of origin (Carroll and Hannan 2000), partly because we have learned that
observations on the very early history are crucial for examining processes of
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legitimation (Hannan and Carroll 1992). But, what is the theoretical status of
such a collection of entities in the period before a form has been established?
If we dene populations in terms of forms, we lack a warrant for extending the
denition of the population back to the origin. Obviously, we would prefer a
denition of population that allows meaningful specication of a single unit that
spans the entire history.
Our foundational material suggests that dening populations in terms of
external identities|instead of forms|provides a potential solution. We can
imagine that each new socially enforced external identity initiates a population.
Most such populations will amount to little. However, sometimes other entities
come to share this identity and a process of legitimation begins. As the number
of entities with this default identity grows, the taken-for-grantedness of the
identity strengthens until it reaches a ceiling (Hannan and Carroll 1992). Our
denition of form reects this reasoning in stating the requirement that an
external identity gains the status of form only when some specic number of
instances, (), exist. Now we can interpret () as the ceiling, the level of
density at which the identity takes on the character of a form. The period
in a population's history between its inception and the time at which density
surpasses () is the crucial period of legitimation in the sense of taken-for-
grantedness.
Dening populations in terms of minimal identities resolves the two ambi-
guities. The minimal property ensures that populations are localized to the
most specic socially enforced identities. The reliance on identities instead of
forms allows us to dene populations that never achieve form status and to
extend meaningfully the denitions of population back to the period of early
legitimation.
We think that this approach oers another advantage. Organizational an-
alysts are often struck by what they see as a strong social-movement avor in
the early history of a population with activists seeking to promulgate denitions
and codes of conduct for members of the movement (Carroll and Hannan 2000).
In our conception, such activity plays an extremely important role. To see this,
consider the question: how are external identities enforced before an identity
has become suÆciently taken for granted to be regarded as a form? Activists
and movement entrepreneurs play precisely this role. Absent the webs of co-
operative action and standard setting that characterize early histories of many
successful population, social identities are unlikely to nd external enforcement.
The absence of strong enforcement makes it unlikely that an identity will achieve
the standing of form.
We also need to formalize the notion of boundedness. We introduce a predi-
cate L(!; ; ) that reads as \actor ! is located in a particular bounded system
 in period ." As we explain in the next section, just because we can write a
predicate for boundedness does not mean that it is a simple matter to estab-
lish the relevant boundaries. Because the relevant boundaries depend upon the
processes under study, getting the boundaries right will often be as diÆcult as
getting the forms right.
Now we can provide an improved formal denition of population:
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Denition 16 (Population) A population is a set of entities with a common min-
imal external identity in a bounded system within a period.
(; ; ) =
n
! j( 2 eic
min
!;
) ^ L(!; ; )
o
:
Implications for Research Design
We think that this new formulation has far-reaching implications for practice.
First, meaningful specication of a population depends upon (1) precise un-
derstanding of the social codes that specify externally enforced identities and
(2) proper delineation of the system boundaries, i.e., choosing L appropriately.
These are challenging requirements. Correct delineation of the social codes and
system boundaries requires intensive study of the institutional context within
which a set of organizations operates.
We think that these requirements also have strong implications for designs
of empirical studies. Current research pursues two main design philosophies:
one tries to get broad representativeness of the world of organizations over rela-
tively short time periods (e.g., the National Organizations Survey [Kalleberg et
al. 1996]), and the other, the population design, focuses narrowly on a segment
of this world but uses a long temporal perspective (Carroll and Hannan 2000).
The representativeness design maximizes variability in forms, while the popu-
lation design minimizes such variability. The representativeness design would
seem to provide more information about forms. However, it seems implausible,
in the present state of knowledge, to identify the forms meaningfully. If many
forms are represented, then the analyst must specify correctly an enormous
number of social codes.
Our experience, based on application of the simpler population design to a
relatively small number of arenas (audit companies, automobile manufacturers,
banks, credit unions, life insurance companies, manufacturing rms, brewers, la-
bor unions, newspapers, and semiconductor manufacturers) indicates that sev-
eral years of close study is required to grasp the important institutional details
that provide the key information about identities and forms. Whatever one
decides about the merits of the two designs, an appreciation of the centrality
of social codes in dening forms leads to a deep re-examination of the issues
involved.
Second, because social codes and relevant system boundaries vary over time,
population denitions are historically specic and change over time. There-
fore, it is usually a mistake to impose an invariant population specication
over long historical periods. The American brewing industry provides a useful
illustration of the challenges (Carroll and Swaminathan 1998). Over several cen-
turies, all brewers were what today are called microbrewers, because they used
hand-crafted methods and traditional ingredients. They also operated in local
markets, with the city or town dening the boundaries of competition. Over
this period, then, the industry consisted of a great many localized populations,
with each population exemplifying the same external identity. Of course, such
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enterprises were called brewers, not microbrewers. The microbrewing identity
has an oppositional avor; such an identity requires the existence of another
identity that is not micro.
During this century, the brewing industry bifurcated in form, as some rms
began to produce beer using industrial methods and new recipes, which in-
cluded many additives not culturally sanctioned previously, and others retained
traditional methods. By the end of World War II, the mass-production brewers
had attained dominance in the industry, which became exceedingly concen-
trated. At the same time, the boundaries shifted to the national|and even the
international|level. At that time, there was a national population of mass-
production brewers and a lingering populations of traditional brewers.
Within the past two decades, population boundaries have shifted once again.
Movements of local associations of hobby brewers succeeded in gaining legisla-
tion in various states that permitted traditional brewers to operate in a new
mode. Specically, the new form integrates production, sale, and consump-
tion at a single site. This arrangement was|and still is|forbidden to the
major brewers. It has come to be known as the brewpub form. The brew-
pub's emergence occurred hand in hand with development of another form: the
micro-brewery, which is a small-scale brewery producing for distribution. The
numbers of both types of breweries have grown into the hundreds in little over a
decade (Carroll and Swaminathan 1998). A crucial part of the story of the rise
of these two types is that they became external identities and then forms in the
sense in which we use the terms. The activists in the movement succeeded in
creating two distinctive identities that dier sharply from the identity of mass
brewer. The key was posing the issues in terms of authenticity, involving slav-
ish conformity to a set of specic traditional methods and the invocation of
nostalgic images of craft production.
The rise of the two forms, of course, amounts to a recreation of the historic
forms in the industry. This development has complicated the industry's topog-
raphy of forms in two ways. First, the diversity of forms has increased. Second,
the boundaries of the populations dened by these forms dier. The industrial,
mass-brewer population is still national. So there is a single population of mass
brewers. The brewpub population is, by virtue of its dependence on consump-
tion at the site of sale, exceedingly local with respect to market competition, but
not ows of information and legitimacy. The microbrewer population stands in
an intermediate position, with some brewers emphasizing their local roots and
others striving to operate on a national level. According to this account, the
brewing industry has persisted for hundreds of years, but the populations of
brewers have changed markedly over time.
A third implication of the denition bears on the enumeration of populations
in the context in which form distinctions are nested. Consider the example
of American national labor unions. Hannan and Freeman (1987; 1988) ana-
lyzed the ecological dynamics of the entire population of American labor unions
and conducted analyzes of the two important subidentities and subforms: craft
unions (in which workers are organized according to craft or occupational dis-
tinctions) and industrial unions (in which workers are organized by site of em-
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ployment irrespective of craft or occupation). According to their understanding,
the craft and industrial forms were minimal. The proposed denition would sug-
gest that the Hannan{Freeman study amassed data on three populations: craft
unions, industrial unions, and unions that did not t either minimal form but
still t the labor-union form. In this view, the set of all unions does not com-
prise a meaningful population and should not be the main focus of analysis.
Instead, analyses of the subforms should be given priority. Similarly, our sketch
of the brewing industry shows that the same kind of implication holds for anal-
ysis of the contemporary period: the set of brewers does not constitute a single
population.
Conclusion
>From a substantive perspective, the most important feature of our proposed
approach is its grounding of forms in identities. Our conception of identity, while
consistent with much sociological thinking on the subject, expresses identity in
terms of constraint. Potential identities are constraints that inform defaults,
which tell what can be expected of an entity that possesses the identity. Social
valuations convert potential identities into real identities, real in the sense that
violations of the default assumptions has the price of lowered valuation.
Making these ideas suÆciently precise to serve as a basis for theory and
research on the evolution of forms requires careful specication of defaults. Our
approach develops a formal language for constraints and defaults using formal
semantics. This strategy imposes obvious costs: gaining intuition about the
approach requires close study of the somewhat dense formalism. We think
that the approach has potential benets that more than outweigh the costs.
It provides a unied treatment of issues that heretofore have been analyzed in
isolation: organizational identity and organizational form. It also improves the
clarity of the formulation and allows checks for consistency among its various
facets.
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